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Defending Patagonia: Mergers and 




Yvon Chouinard, founder of Patagonia, stated that “benefit 
corporation legislation creates the legal framework to enable mission-
driven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven through 
succession, capital raises, and even changes in ownership.”  This 
article uses Patagonia, one of the most visible benefit corporations, in 
the article’s examination of Chouinard’s claim and in the article’s 
exploration of issues surrounding benefit corporations in the mergers 
and acquisitions context.  
Of special interest are the seminal Delaware cases of Unocal and 
Revlon, and how, if at all, the tests created by those cases should be 
applied to benefit corporations.  This article concludes that the 
Unocal test could be used to evaluate takeover defenses erected by 
benefit corporations, but argues that the test should be modified to 
more clearly allow directors to protect the mission of their benefit 
corporation, even if the mission “openly eschews shareholder wealth 
maximization.”  A more difficult issue arises when the break-up or 
sale of a benefit corporation becomes inevitable and the benefit 
corporation, incorporated in a state that follows Delaware law, enters 
“Revlon-mode.”  To provide a practical corporate governance 
framework, this article concludes that Revlon should remain relevant 
for benefit corporations that are incorporated in states following 
Delaware law, but proposes statutory amendments requiring a 
partial-asset lock and an annual charitable giving floor to ensure 
public benefit.  
 
* J. Haskell Murray is an assistant professor at Regent University School of Law.  This 
article was prepared for the Hasting Business Law Journal’s symposium entitled “Incorporating 
Change: How Social Benefit Legislation is Reshaping the Corporate Outlook.”  The author 
thanks for their comments: Bill Baxley, David Groshoff, and Alicia Plerhoples.  Samuel 
Moultrie and Kevin Hoffman provided excellent research assistance.  The opinions expressed 
and any errors made are solely those of the author. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Benefit corporation legislation creates the legal framework to 
enable mission-driven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-
driven through succession, capital raises, and even changes in 
ownership, by institutionalizing the values, culture, processes, and 
high standards put in place by founding entrepreneurs.1
—Yvon Chouinard, Founder of Patagonia 
 
 
In early January 2012, Patagonia became one of the first 
California benefit corporations.2
While Patagonia is a privately held California benefit 
corporation, this article explores possibilities that include envisioning 
Patagonia as a publicly traded corporation and Patagonia as a 
Delaware benefit corporation (or a benefit corporation in a state that 
closely follows Delaware law, because Delaware does not yet have a 
benefit corporation statute).
  Patagonia also became one of the 
largest corporations, and perhaps the most well-known corporation in 
the United States, to convert to a benefit corporation.  This article 
explores the above-quoted claim of Patagonia’s founder, Yvon 
Chouinard.  Will the benefit corporation statutes enable companies 
like Patagonia to preserve their mission in the face of hostile takeover 
threats?  To what extent should the benefit corporation statutes 
protect against such threat?   
3
Part II of this article provides a brief background on Patagonia 
and on the benefit corporation statutes.  Part III examines how a 
court following Unocal
  No stretch of the imagination is needed 
to envision a future Patagonia as a publicly traded company and some 
version of a benefit corporation statute being enacted in Delaware.   
4 and its progeny might analyze takeover 
defenses erected by benefit corporations, taking special interest in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2010 case of eBay v. Newmark.5
 
 1. Patagonia Registers as First California Benefit Corporation, CSR WIRE (Jan., 30, 2012), 
http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/33565-Patagonia-Registers-as-First-California-Benefit-
Corporation. 
  Part 
 2. Id. 
 3. Yvon Chouinard currently controls Patagonia’s stock.  Seth Stevenson, Patagonia’s 
Founder Is America’s Most Unlikely Business Guru, WSJ (Apr. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com 
/article/SB10001424052702303513404577352221465986612.html.  A few days before the final 
edits on this article were due, statutory amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law 
allowing the creation of “public benefit corporations” were proposed.  Haskell Murray, 
Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, SOCENTLAW (March 20, 2013), 
http://socentlaw.com/2013/03/delaware-public-benefit-corporation-legislation. 
 4. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 5. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
MURRAY (DO NOT DELETE)  3/31/2013  11:30 PM 
Spring 2013 DEFENDING PATAGONIA 487 
IV ventures into Revlon-land and argues that Revlon should remain 
relevant in the benefit corporation context.6  Part V examines and 
evaluates preexisting potential ways a company like Patagonia could 
protect its mission.  Part VI discusses solutions offered by the existing 
benefit corporation statutes, suggests modifications to those statutes, 
and builds on the author’s previous work on benefit corporation 
governance by focusing on the mergers and acquisitions context.7  
Finally, the article concludes that an appropriately modified benefit 
corporation statute could reduce “mission drift,” also known as 
“mission creep,” but would not and should not create an absolute 
lock on the corporation’s original mission.8
 
 
II. PATAGONIA AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
A.  PATAGONIA: THE FLAGSHIP BENEFIT CORPORATION 
 
Rock climber, surfer, and environmentalist Yvon Chouinard 
founded the outdoor clothing company Patagonia, Inc. in 1973.9  
Patagonia recently recorded over $500 million in annual sales,10 has 
been dubbed “the coolest company on the planet,”11 and aspires to 
“use business to inspire and implement solutions to the 
environmental crisis.”12  In his most recent book, The Responsible 
Company, Chouinard acknowledges that Patagonia is not perfect, but 
states that the company seriously seeks to benefit society and the 
environment.13
 
 6. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
  Patagonia’s numerous social and environmental 
 7. See generally J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, 
Certifications and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2085000 (discussing benefit corporation 
governance, but only briefly mentioning the mergers and acquisitions context). 
 8. Professor Jenkins defines “mission creep” as “an organizational phenomenon in which 
entities inadvertently, over time, stray from their fundamental mission by engaging in activities 
or behaviors less closely related to the core charitable purpose.”  Garry W. Jenkins, Who's 
Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 805 n.212 (2011). 
 9. YVON CHOUINARD, LET MY PEOPLE GO SURFING: THE EDUCATION OF A 
RELUCTANT BUSINESSMAN 38–44 (2006). 
 10. Patagonia, The World’s 50 Most Innovative Companies, FAST COMPANY, 
www.fastcompany. com/most-innovative-companies/2012/patagonia (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 11. Susan Casey, Patagonia: Blueprint for Green Business, FORTUNE, Apr. 2, 2007, at 62, 
available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/04/02/8403423/ 
index.htm. 
 12. YVON CHOUINARD & VINCENT STANLEY, THE RESPONSIBLE COMPANY (back cover) 
(2012). 
 13. See CHOUINARD & STANLEY, supra note 12, at 5. 
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initiatives include providing health care to part-time workers, 
providing flexible working schedules, enforcing a code of conduct on 
all primary suppliers, using primarily environmentally preferred 
materials, and donating one percent of sales to environmental 
NGOs.14
On November 9, 2012, Chouinard turned 74 years old.
 
15  Like all 
of us, he will die.  It is reasonable to assume, especially given the 
opening quote, that he would like his life’s work to continue after he 
is gone.  It is also reasonable to assume that he would want Patagonia 
to continue to operate in an environmentally friendly manner and 
support environmental causes after he is gone.  While completely 
preventing “mission drift” may be neither possible nor necessarily 
desirable, benefit corporation law could help ensure that a mission 
shift is reasonably difficult and that at least a portion of the assets are 
devoted to the intended corporate mission.16  The benefit corporation 
statutes may provide additional valuable protection for risk-averse 
managers and could serve as a valuable warning device to possible 
acquirers.17  While this article suggests that the current benefit 
corporation statutes are far from perfect, there is reason to believe 
benefit corporation statutes, coupled with statutory amendments 




B.  BRIEF HISTORY OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
 
In 2007, B Lab, a nonprofit organization, began certifying 
companies as “Certified B Corporations.”19
 
 14. B Corp Community: Patagonia Inc., B LAB CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http:// 
bcorporation.net/community/directory/patagonia (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).  
  Eventually, B Lab also 
 15. America’s Best Leaders 2009, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT http://www.usnews.com/ 
listings/best-leaders/4-yvon-chouinard (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).   
 16. See infra Parts V and VI. 
 17. Profit-focused acquirers could, however, see benefit corporations as attractive targets 
because of the social goodwill the benefit corporation has created.  Alicia Plerhoples, Can an 
Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social 
Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221, 235 (2012).  In addition, some 
profit-focused acquirers could see benefit corporations as poorly managed and envision 
opportunities to cut the social and environmental programs, increase profits, and subsequently 
sell for a quick profit.   Parts III, IV, and V discuss the legal hurdles that a profit-focused 
acquirer would have to clear under the current law and additional amendments to the benefit 
corporation statutes that should be considered. 
 18. See infra Parts V and VI. 
 19. Murray, supra note 7 (discussing the differences between Certified B Corporations and 
benefit corporations). 
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started lobbying states to pass benefit corporation statutes, and in 
2010 Maryland became the first state to pass such a statute.20  Since 
then, 11 other states have passed similar benefit corporation 
statutes.21  A number of the states have passed the legislation 
unanimously,22 but a few states have rejected or stalled the bills.23  As 
of the date of publication of this article, there is no known litigation 
involving benefit corporation governance.  Currently, there are 
approximately 700 Certified B Corporations and approximately 200 
entities formed as benefit corporations.24
According to their proponents, the benefit corporation statutes 
combat the shareholder wealth maximization norm that they claim is 
mandated by traditional corporate law.
 
25  In practice, except in a 
small handful of cases—Dodge v. Ford,26 Revlon,27 and eBay v. 
Newmark28—courts very rarely enforce shareholder wealth 
maximization.29  Among the exceptions, however, the takeover cases 




 20. Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CSR WIRE 
(Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-
to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation. 
 21. Benefit Corp. State by State Legislation, CERTIFIED BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION, 
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 22. See PA Leads B Corporations Push, But Will It Become Official?, KEYSTONE EDGE 
(May 3, 2012), http://www.keystoneedge.com/features/bcorporations0503.aspx (noting the nine 
unanimous floor votes for benefit corporations as of May 2012). 
 23. To date, at least Michigan, North Carolina, and Colorado have provided some 
resistance to passing the model benefit corporation legislation. 
 24. CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net.  The number of benefit 
corporations is difficult to determine with accuracy, as many secretaries of states do not 
separate benefit corporations from traditional corporations, but the estimate of 200 benefit 
corporations is made based on the author’s efforts calling secretaries of states, and consultation 
with B Lab personnel.  An incomplete list of benefit corporations can be found at the following 
website: http://www.benefitcorp.net/find-a-benefit-corp/search.  See also Eric Talley, Corporate 
Form and Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report from California (and Beyond) 7 (UC 
Berkeley Pub. L. Research, Working Paper No. 2144567, Sept. 10, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144567 (reporting that 60 benefit 
corporations had been formed in California by mid-August 2012.  Professor Talley also 
mentions that this number of benefit corporations is massively dwarfed by the roughly 60,000 
new incorporations occurred overall during the same period of time in California.”). 
 25. See Murray, supra note 7 (detailing the debate over the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm). 
 26. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 27. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
 28. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 29. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 288 (1998) 
(noting that “[a]lthough it is possible for shareholders to prevail on claims that the board of 
directors violated the shareholder primacy norm, such cases are extremely rare”). 
 30. See infra Part III. 
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III.  TAKEOVER DEFENSES, UNOCAL, AND EBAY 
A.  TWO-PRONGED UNOCAL TEST 
 
A seminal case in the takeover defense area is the Delaware 
Supreme Court case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.31  In 
analyzing the use of a self-tender offer as a takeover defense, Unocal 
applied what “has been called an ‘intermediate’ or ‘enhanced 
business judgment’ standard of review, but is perhaps best described 
as a ‘conditional business judgment rule.’”32  The Unocal court stated, 
“[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting 
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and 
its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial 
examination before the protections of the business judgment rule may 
be conferred.”33  Under the first prong of the two-pronged Unocal 
test, the directors of the company enacting the takeover defense bear 
the burden of showing a “danger to corporate policy or 
effectiveness.”34 Under the second prong, the directors must also 
prove that the takeover defense was “reasonable in relation to the 
threat posed.”35  If the directors satisfy both prongs of the Unocal test 
then the business judgment rule applies.  But if the directors fail to 
carry their burden on either prong then the intrinsic fairness test 
applies.36  While the two-prong test is merely the first part of the 
inquiry to determine which standard applies, the answer to the initial 
inquiry is usually outcome determinative.37
 
 31. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director 
Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge I]; 
Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 491 (2001). 
  Ten years after Unocal, 
the Unitrin court added that “if the board of directors’ defensive 
 32. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 254 (3d ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter BAINBRIDGE (M&A)]. 
 33. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
 34. Id. at 955.  Directors may carry their burden under the first prong by “showing good 
faith and reasonable investigation.” Id. The director’s proof is “materially enhanced” if the 
board is “comprised of a majority of outside directors.” Id. 
 35. Id. at 955–56.  Under the second prong, which is an element of balance, the court will 
analyze the “nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise.”  Id. at 955.  
The court listed the following as potential concerns: “inadequacy of the price offered, nature 
and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than 
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), 
the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange.” Id. 
 36. Id. at 9585; R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.20 (3d. ed. 1997 & Supp. 2012). 
 37. BAINBRIDGE (M&A), supra note 32, at 257.   
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response is not draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is within a 
‘range of reasonableness,’ a court must not substitute its judgment for 
the board’s.”38
Academic commentators have noted that, while the Unocal test 
may be called an “enhanced” or “intermediate” standard of review, 
the test is seldom used to hold directors accountable.
 
39  Unocal 
expressly allows consideration of “constituencies other than 
shareholders” and stated that “perhaps” the community in general 
could even be considered.40
Of the 12 states that have passed benefit corporation statutes, 
one has cited Unocal approvingly, three have expressly rejected 
Unocal, and eight have not yet cited Unocal either positively or 
negatively in cases involving their state’s law.
 
41  The states that have 
rejected or not yet addressed Unocal appear to mostly use the 
business judgment rule in takeover defense situations, giving directors 




B.  EBAY AND TRADITIONAL FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS 
 
The eBay v. Newmark43 case arose out of disagreements between 
eBay and the two founders of Craigslist (Craig Newmark and James 
Buckmaster).44  As of August 10, 2004, craigslist had three 
shareholders: Newmark owned 42.6 percent, Buckmaster owned 29 
percent, and eBay owned 28.4 percent.45  EBay expressed interest in 
taking over craigslist, allegedly misused Craigslist’s confidential 
information to launch a competing website, and disagreed with the 
founders on numerous operational issues.46
 
 38. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995). 
  Not interested in selling 
craigslist and wishing to “gracefully unwind the relationship” with 
eBay, the founders of Craigslist took three primary actions that led to 
 39. See, e.g., Bainbridge I, supra note 31, at 772 (citing academics who have criticized 
Unocal as a “toothless standard”).  In contrast, Unocal has also been called “the most 
innovative and promising in [Delaware’s] recent corporation law.”  City Capital Assocs. Ltd. 
P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
 40. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 41. See infra Appendix A. 
 42. Id. 
 43. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 44. Id. at 6; see generally David A. Wishnick, Corporate Purposes in a Free Enterprise 
System:  A Comment on eBay v. Newmark, Comment, 121 YALE L.J. 2405 (2012). 
 45. eBay, 16 A.3d at 11. 
 46. Id. at 15–20. 
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the litigation: “(1) implementation of a staggered board through 
amendments to the craigslist charter and bylaws (the “Staggered 
Board Amendments”); (2) approval of a stockholder rights plan (the 
“Rights Plan”); and (3) an offer to issue one new share of craigslist 
stock in exchange for every five shares on which a craigslist 
stockholder granted a right of first refusal in favor of craigslist (the 
“ROFR/Dilutive Issuance”).”47  The Chancellor applied the Unocal 
standard to the Rights Plan and rescinded the entire plan.48
The eBay v. Newmark case has been used aggressively by 
proponents of the benefit corporation statutes.  For example, B Lab 
co founder Jay Coen Gilbert stated, according to eBay, “the only 
game in town, if you are a U.S. corporation, is to maximize 
shareholder value.  That makes it awfully hard to care about what 
you’re doing with your employees or what you’re doing with your 
community or what you are doing with the environment when that is 
the law of the land and if you don’t do that you can get sued.”
 
49  
Furthermore, the Benefit Corporation White Paper, authored by a 
number of attorneys who are promoting the form, states that “[i]n 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery recently reaffirmed its position that corporate directors are 
obligated pursuant to their fiduciary duties to maximize shareholder 
value.”50
 
 47. eBay, 16 A.3d at 19–21. 
  A fair reading of Delaware law, however, shows much more 
deference to directorial decisionmaking than either of these 
statements suggest, but Chancellor Leo Strine added fuel to the fire 
with his 2012 Wake Forest Law Review article titled Our Continuing 
 48. Id. at 28–35.  The eBay v. Newmark case, which amounted to a rare loss for directors, 
could have breathed a bit of life into what has been called a dead or dying Unocal case.  Robert 
B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred 
Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 286–94 (2001) (describing Unocal as a 
“dead letter” and stating that directors virtually always win under the Unocal standard)  
However, the ebay court mentioned that this appeared to be the first case of an extremely 
closely held corporation utilizing a Rights Plan and noted that the craigslist stockholders were 
not “dispersed, disempowered, or vulnerable stockholders” that Rights Plans were usually used 
to protect.  eBay, 15 A.3d at 30–31.  As such, eBay’s impact may be limited.  
 49. Jay Coen Gilbert, TedX xPhilly – Jay Coen Gilbert – On Better Business, YOUTUBE, 
at 9:40–10:02 (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGnz-w9p5FU. 
 50. William H. Clark & Larry Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the Benefit 
Corporation:  Why It Is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs, 
Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public 11 (Benefits Corp. White Paper, 2012), available at 
http://www.benefitcorp. net/storage/The_Need_and_Rationale_for_Benefit_Corporations_-
_April_2012.pdf. 
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Struggle With The Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit.51  
In that article, Chancellor Strine argued “that the corporate law 
requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a 
good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders,” but he 
also clarified that he did “not mean to imply that the corporate law 
requires directors to maximize short-term profits for stockholders.”52
While the outcome in eBay v. Newmark may be rare, its impact 
could be quite significant.  For example, while the 1919 Dodge v. 
Ford case, which overrode Henry Ford’s decision not to pay special 
dividends in a purported attempt to benefit society with the funds, 
was admittedly “atavistic,” it has impacted corporate law practice for 
almost an entire century by pushing risk-averse business people 
toward more emphasis on shareholder wealth.
 
53  Norms and practices 
that spring from cases like Dodge v. Ford can reach much further 
than the actual holding of the case or any precedential power the case 
may possess.54  The eBay case has the potential for a large impact 
similar to Dodge v. Ford, especially in the takeover defense arena, 
even if some academics feel that eBay was wrongly decided or should 
be limited to minority oppression fact patterns.55
The benefit corporation legislation alleviates fears of the eBay 
situation repeating itself by explicitly stating that the purpose of a 
benefit corporation is not shareholder wealth maximization but rather 
  While the Unocal 
standard is generally toothless, the eBay case will likely work itself 
into corporate lore and could push risk adverse social entrepreneurs, 
especially those using the Delaware for-profit corporate form, in the 
direction of shareholder wealth maximization. 
 
 51. Leo E. Strine, Jr. Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012).  One can read Chancellor Strine’s article as 
arguing for an extension of eBay beyond the takeover defense area. 
 52. Leo E. Strine, Jr., supra note 51, at 155 (emphasis added). 
 53. William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a 
Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 1383, 1385 n.7 (2005). 
 54. See generally Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 519 (2012).  While eBay is a lower court decision, it comes from the 
highly influential Delaware Court of Chancery.  Dodge v. Ford, on the other hand, was a case 
from Michigan, a state that has comparatively little influence on the course of corporate law. 
 55. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Beyond the Inevitable and Inadequate Regulation of 
Bankers: A Comment on Painter, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 29, 37 n.29 (2010) (noting problems 
with the eBay decision); see also e-mail from Professor Lynn Stout (March 25, 2013 12:31 EST) 
(confirming her view that eBay is merely an oppression case).  Cf. D. Gordon Smith, The 
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 323 (1998) (noting that the shareholder primacy 
norm “first appeared in cases involving closely held corporations, which today would be treated 
under the doctrine of minority oppression”). 
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a “general public benefit.”56  The Unocal test could still be used in 
evaluating a benefit corporation’s takeover defense, but the threats 
and the reasonableness of the response would be evaluated in light of 
the purpose of the benefit corporation.  The stated purpose of the 
benefit corporation would also prevent courts from concluding, as 
Chancellor Chandler did in eBay, that “[p]romoting, protecting, or 
pursuing nonstockholder considerations must lead at some point to 
value for stockholders.”57
Takeover defenses erected by directors of a benefit corporation 
to protect the entity from those focusing on short-term profits, and 
from rulings like those in eBay v. Newmark, should be allowed, but 
the takeover defenses should still have to be reasonably related to the 
mission of the entity.  The current benefit corporation statutes do not 
require managers to prioritize among the stakeholders, but this 
author has suggested that the statutes should at least require benefit 
corporations to choose their top priority to guide courts, directors, 
and investors.
   
58  Once the top priority is chosen, the courts could 
more easily use the Unocal test to determine whether the takeover 
defense was a reasonable protection of the entity’s mission and its 
priorities.  Benefit corporation directors would be able to protect the 
company’s mission, without fear of ruling like the one in eBay v. 
Newmark, but the clear statement of the entity’s top priority would 
allow courts to effectively use the Unocal test to attack unreasonable 
takeover defenses that were erected only to entrench the directors 
and not to protect the entity’s mission.59
 
 56. See Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 102(a), 201(a) (defining “general public 
benefit” as “[a] material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, 
assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit 
corporation.”), available at www.benefitcorp.net/storage/Model_Legislation.pdf (making the 
creation of “general public benefit”, defined as “[a] material positive impact on society and the 
environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and 
operations of a benefit corporation.”).  Most of the state benefit corporation statutes closely 
follow the model legislation.  See J. Haskell Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute 
Comparison Chart (Dec. 6, 2012), available at 
   
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1988556. 
 57. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d at 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 58. Murray, supra note 7 (proposing that benefit corporation statutes require benefit 
corporations to state the stakeholder of primary importance in the corporation’s governing 
documents). 
 59. The “general public benefit purpose” required in the benefit corporation statutes would 
likely allow directors of benefit corporations to erect draconian takeover defenses and hide 
behind the vague, unprioritized language to completely entrench themselves.  See Unocal Corp. 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (stating that the “omnipresent specter” of 
self-interest and the directors’ natural desire to entrench themselves in their positions leads to 
the need for an enhanced duty and additional judicial scrutiny). 
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IV.  EXPLORING REVLON-LAND 
 
A.  REVLON BACKGROUND 
  
 Revlon is one of the most cited and most controversial cases in 
corporate law.60  In that case, Revlon faced a hostile takeover bid 
from Ronald Pearlman’s Pantry Pride, Inc. (“Pantry Pride”) and used 
defensive measures to favor its “white knight” Forstmann Little & 
Co. and its affiliates (collectively, “Forstmann”).61  The court found 
that Revlon ended the auction, involving Pearlman and Forstmann, 
prematurely by granting Forstmann an option to buy certain valuable 
Revlon assets at a discount (the “lock-up option”), a no-shop 
provision, and a $25 million cancellation fee.62  The Delaware 
Supreme Court upheld the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision to 
enjoin the defensive measures.63
 Revlon claimed that one of the reasons it accepted Forstmann’s 
offer was because his offer was better for constituencies other than 
stockholders, including noteholders.
 
64  The court rejected that 
argument, stating “while concern for various corporate constituencies 
is proper when addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited 
by the requirement that there be some rationally related benefit 
accruing to the stockholders.”65  The court further explained “[a] 
board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its 
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits 
accruing to the stockholders.  However, such concern for non-
stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active 
bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or 
maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest 
bidder.”66
Under Revlon, when: 
 
it became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was 
inevitable . . . .  The duty of the board had thus changed from the 
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of 
 
 60. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 36, § 4.20. 
 61. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 175–76 (Del. 1986). 
 62. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175–76. 
 63. Id. at 185. 
 64. Id. at 179.  The court explained that the noteholders’ interests were protected by 
contract. Id. 182–83. 
 65. Id. at 176. 
 66. Id. at 182 (citation omitted). 
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the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.  This 
significantly altered the board’s responsibilities under the Unocal 
standards.  It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and 
effectiveness, or to the stockholders’ interests, from a grossly 
inadequate bid.  The whole question of defensive measures became 
moot.  The directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate 
bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company.67
 
   
As evidenced by these quotes, once a company enters Revlon-land, it 
must intensify focus on shareholder wealth.  
 
B.  TIME AND QVC 
 
This section will address two major cases following Revlon:  
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc. (“Time”)68 and 
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (“QVC”).69  
Like Revlon, these opinions are by no means recent, but they all still 
hold prominent places in the mergers and acquisitions case law.70
Time is a case that many may think supports social 
entrepreneurs.  In Time, the court found that Revlon was not 
triggered when the corporation was merely “in play” or “up for 
sale.”
 
71  Rather, Revlon is triggered in at least two situations: when 
(1) “a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell 
itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up 
of the company” or (2) “in response to a bidder’s offer, a target 
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction 
involving the breakup of the company.”72  Though Revlon did not 
apply in Time, Unocal did.73
 
 67. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (emphasis added). 
  Applying the Unocal test, the Time 
court reaffirmed director primacy and deferred to Time’s board of 
directors’ decision to take an offer from Warner Communication, Inc. 
 68. 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 69. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).  Professor Bainbridge provides a detailed map of Revlon-land 
and its progeny.  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2115769 [hereinafter Bainbridge II]. 
 70. Bainbridge II, supra note 69, at 24. 
 71. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1989). 
 72. Id. at 1150.  The court left open the possibility that other actions, outside of the two 
listed, might trigger Revlon.  Id.  The QVC court reiterated the disjunctive nature of this quote 
and the fact that the Time court intentionally included the phrase “without excluding other 
possibilities” when discussing the instances where Revlon applied.  QVC, 637 A.2d at 46–48. 
 73. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150–51. 
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that was much lower, on its face, than a competing offer from 
Paramount.74  The Time board claimed it rejected Paramount’s offer 
because it was “inadequate” and because “the Warner transaction 
offered a greater long-term value for the stockholders and, unlike 
Paramount’s offer, did not pose a threat to Time’s survival and its 
‘culture.’”75  In eBay, however, Chancellor Chandler clarified that 
Time76 “did not hold that corporate culture, standing alone, is worthy 
of protection as an end in itself.”77
Approximately five years later, in QVC, Paramount found itself 
on the other side of the argument, and tried to use much of the same 
reasoning that had beaten them in Time.
 
78  Paramount favored 
Viacom over QVC and agreed to a number of significant deal-
protection measures.79  The court reiterated director primacy, but 
stated that enhanced scrutiny was appropriate in the QVC case 
because: “(1) the approval of a transaction resulting in a sale of 
control, and (2) the adoption of defensive measures in response to a 
threat to corporate control.”80  The Delaware Supreme Court focused 
on impact of the change of control in QVC to distinguish it from 
Time.81
[o]nce control has shifted, the current Paramount stockholders will 
have no leverage in the future to demand another control premium.  
As a result, the Paramount stockholders are entitled to receive, and 
should receive, a control premium and/or protective devices of 
significant value.  There being no such protective provisions in the 
Viacom–Paramount transaction, the Paramount directors had an 
obligation to take the maximum advantage of the current 
  The court noted that: 
 
 74. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at at 1148–53. 
 75. Id. at 1149. 
 76. 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 77. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010).  The court 
stated that the possibility of eBay departing from craigslist’s “public-service mission in favor of 
increased monetization of craigslist” upon the death of the Craigslist founders was not a valid 
reason for adopting the Rights Plan.  Id. at 32. 
 78. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994). 
 79. Id. at 37–41. 
 80. Id. at 42; see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends 
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge III]. 
 81. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42–43.  “Following such consummation, there will be a controlling 
stockholder who will have the voting power to: (a) elect directors; (b) cause a break-up of the 
corporation; (c) merge it with another company; (d) cash-out the public stockholders; (e) amend 
the certificate of incorporation; (f) sell all or substantially all of the corporate assets; or (g) 
otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation and the public stockholders’ interests. 
Irrespective of the present Paramount Board’s vision of a long-term strategic alliance with 
Viacom, the proposed sale of control would provide the new controlling stockholder with the 
power to alter that vision.”  Id. at 43. 
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The court reiterated that  “[i]n the sale of control context, the 
directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the 
transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the 
stockholders—and they must exercise their fiduciary duties to further 
that end.”83  While the QVC court stated “there is ‘no single 
blueprint’ directors must follow” in the sale process, the court did 
mention that directors must be diligent and act in good faith.84  After 
noting the complexity of the board’s task, the court reminded the 
reader that “a court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be 
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a 
perfect decision.”85
The QVC court distinguished Time by stating, “[i]n [Time], the 
Chancellor held that there was no change of control in the original 
stock-for-stock merger between Time and Warner because Time 
would be owned by a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders 




  While Time might have given 
Patagonia some hope, Revlon, QVC, and eBay show that directors of 
traditional Delaware corporations still need to focus on shareholder 
value. 
V.  PRE-EXISTING SOLUTIONS FOR DEFENDING 
PATAGONIA 
 
How could Yvon Chouinard defend Patagonia’s environmental 
mission in the face of holdings in Unocal, Revlon, and eBay, which 
place the focus on shareholder value?  There are a number of viable 
 
 82. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43. 
 83. Id. at 44. 
 84. Id. at 43–44, 48.  In a sale of control, directors can focus on things other than cash 
offered in the deal, such as “fairness and feasibility; the proposed or actual financing for the 
offer, and the consequences of that financing; questions of illegality; . . . the risk of non-
consum[m]ation; . . . the bidder’s identity, prior background and other business venture 
experiences; and the bidder’s business plans for the corporation and their effects on stockholder 
interests.” Id.  at 44. 
 85. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (emphasis in original).  When enhanced scrutiny applies “[t]he 
directors have the burden of proving that they were adequately informed and acted reasonably. 
Id. 
 86. Id. at 46. 
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solutions, including those discussed in this Part below, that pre date 
the benefit corporation. 
 
A.  CHARTER PROVISIONS 
 
Opponents of the benefit corporation statutes argue that the 
statutes are unnecessary because corporations can already be 
organized to serve social and environmental purposes.  For example, 
the Delaware General Corporation Law states that the certificate of 
incorporation may set forth 
[a]ny provision for the management of the business and for the 
conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision 
creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the 
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of 
the stockholders, or the governing body, members, or any class 
or group of members of a nonstock corporation; if such 
provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State.87
Whether a social and environmental purpose clause would 
violate the law of Delaware may be open to debate, though the better 
argument seems to be that such a clause would be allowed, at least if 
included in the initial charter.
 
88  Oregon’s corporate law makes the 
ability to adopt such a purpose clause more explicit, stating that the 
articles of incorporation may include “[a] provision authorizing or 
directing the corporation to conduct the business of the corporation 
in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.”89  This 
Oregon provision implies, but does not expressly state, that 
environmentally and socially responsible management can be 
detrimental to shareholder wealth.90
The benefit corporation solution could be better for the social 
entrepreneur than the charter provision solution for three primary 
reasons.  First, in six of the twelve states that have passed benefit 
corporation legislation, charter provisions of traditional corporations 
can be changed by an affirmative vote of a mere majority of 
shareholders.
   
91
 
 87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2012). 
  In contrast, the benefit corporation statutes generally 
 88. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).  If 
the initial charter contained terms explaining the social or environmental focus of the 
corporation, investors would be put on notice and would have difficulty explaining their 
objection at a later date. 
 89. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(e) (2010). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See infra Appendix B. 
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require approval by two-thirds of shareholders to adopt or terminate 
benefit corporation status, which gives social entrepreneurs more 
confidence that the mission of their company would not be easily 
discarded.92  Second, as discussed below, the benefit corporation 
moniker is a more visible signal to the market than a provision in the 
charter that many investors may never read.93  Third, the California 
benefit corporation statute provides for dissenters’ rights if a 
corporation changes to or from a benefit corporation.94
The current benefit corporation statutes are not perfect, 
however.  The dissenters’ rights and super majority vote are only 
required if the corporation decides to adopt or terminate benefit 
corporation status.
  The 
traditional corporate law in California, however, does not provide for 
dissenters’ rights for amending the corporate charter, so the purpose 
clause solution would be less effective at maintaining the corporate 
purpose than the benefit corporation statute. 
95  The dissenters’ rights and super majority vote 
are not expressly triggered by the statute if a benefit corporation 
changes its specific public benefit purpose or how it chooses to 
prioritize among stakeholders, giving the company freedom to stray 
significantly from its original purpose.96
 
 92. See Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute Comparison Chart, supra note 56 
(summarizing the provisions of the various benefit corporation statutes); see also Appendix B. 
  The dissenters’ rights and 
super majority vote will better protect the mission of the benefit 
corporation if these protection measures are coupled with the 
statutory amendment suggested in a previous article by this author: 
requiring each benefit corporation to choose a specific public benefit 
 93. See infra Part VI.A (describing benefit corporation signaling). 
 94. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14603–14604 (West 2012).  In Choose Your Own Master: Social 
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, the author argued for the 
expansion of dissenters’ rights to other states with benefit corporation statutes as a change in 
corporate purpose can be just as fundamental a change as a merger.  Murray, supra note 7.  
Benefit corporation proponents argue that dissenters’ rights are not included in the model 
benefit corporation legislation because changing corporate form is not a liquidation event.  
Clark & Vranka, supra note 50, at 26–27.  If, however, the change is a good one, the corporation 
should be able to find capital to replace the dissenters. 
 95. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 104–105. 
 96. See generally Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute Comparison Chart, supra 
note 56.  The general corporate code of the given state applies to benefit corporations, except 
where the benefit corporation statute conflicts with the general corporate code.  Model Benefit 
Corp. Legislation § 101(c).  Given that some general corporate codes require approval by a 
super majority of shareholders to amend the corporation’s articles, benefit corporations in those 
states will be required to do so. 
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or specific stakeholder group as its top priority.97
 
  If the identification 
of the benefit corporation’s top priority is required, the benefit 
corporation statute could then require both a super majority vote and 
dissenters’ rights upon a change of that priority.  These amendments 
would give the benefit corporation statute more teeth, help lessen 
investors’ fear about mission-drift, provide directors with more 
guidance, and help elevate the benefit corporation solution over the 
charter amendment solution. 
B.  VOTING CONTROL 
 
Individuals in a number of companies, such as Facebook,98 
Google,99 and the New York Times,100 have retained substantial 
control by entering into voting agreements or voting trusts, or by 
creating and holding high-vote stock.  This voting control may allow 
these individuals to pursue social and environmental causes.  More 
germane to this article, voting control may allow these individuals to 
ward off hostile takeovers that threaten to end the social and 
environmental mission of their companies.  While shareholders may 
generally vote in their own self-interest, dominant shareholders may 
have to worry about oppression lawsuits.101  Dodge v. Ford has been 
characterized as an oppression lawsuit, and in Dodge the minority 
shareholders were at least partially successful.102
 
 97. Murray, supra note 7.  The general public benefit purpose could still be statutorily 
required, but also requiring a prioritized specific public benefit purpose would provide 
additional guidance for directors 
  Also, at some point 
 98. James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER, May 28, 2012, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2012/05/28/120528ta_talk_surowiecki (noting that 
Facebook Chief Executive Officer and co-founder, Mark Zuckerberg, owns 18 percent of the 
company, but controls 57 percent of the shares). 
 99. See Steven M. Davidoff, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-gives-
google-founders-tighter-control/ (stating that Google founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page will 
control Google’s super-voting class B common shares); see also Certificate of Incorporation of 
Google Inc. (last visited Jan. 30, 2013), Art. IV, § 2(a)(ii), available at 
http://investor.google.com/pdf/google-fourth-amended-and-restated-certificate-of-
incorporation.pdf (showing class B stock has 10 votes for every one vote of class A stock. 
 100. Joe Nocera, How Punch Protected the Times, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/opinion/nocera-how-punch-protected-the-times.html?_r=0 
(stating that the “Class B shares, held largely in a family trust, still gave the Sulzbergers the 
power to elect around 70 percent of the board.”). 
 101. See generally F. Hodge O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting 
Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121 (1986–1987). 
 102. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 323 (1998) 
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the voting control will pass to a younger generation who may have a 
different vision for the company, and who may wreck the legacy of 
the corporation’s founders.   
The current benefit corporation statutes partially address this 
inadequacy of the voting control method in preserving the company’s 
mission.  The benefit corporation statutes require benefit 
corporations to pursue a “general public benefit purpose,” but the 
statues do not require prioritization of any specific constituent.103  If a 
primary constituent is not required, a younger generation could shift 
the corporation’s focus (from the environment to employees, for 
example) without much fear of legally imposed consequences.  In a 
previous article, this author addressed this issue by suggesting the 
statute require the appointment of a primary constituent while still 
requiring the consideration of the “general public benefit.”104  While 
an oppression lawsuit might still be possible in the benefit corporation 
context, having the priorities and mission of the benefit corporation 
clearly stated would make a successful oppression lawsuit, when the 
directors were following that stated mission, much less likely.  Some 
may argue that corporations should not be strangled by a founder’s 
dead hand, but the benefit corporation statutes do not completely 
restrain future generations.105  The statutes, instead, allow termination 
of benefit corporation status upon a super majority shareholder vote.  
If the benefit corporation statutes were amended as suggested in this 
article, the statutes would also allow a change of the benefit 







(discussing cases including Dodge v. Ford, Professor Smith concludes that “[c]onflicts among 
shareholders have long been analyzed under the doctrine of minority oppression rather than the 
shareholder primacy norm. Despite the link between the modern doctrine of minority 
oppression and the shareholder primacy norm, the shareholder primacy norm is broader than 
necessary to resolve problems of minority oppression in closely held corporations.”). 
 103. See Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 102(a), 201(a). 
 104. Murray, supra note 7. 
 105. See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1191 (Del. Ch. 1998) (invalidating a dead-
hand poison pill). 
 106. Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute Comparison Chart, supra note 56 (showing 
that most benefit corporation statutes require a two-thirds shareholder vote to adopt or 
terminate benefit corporation status). 
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C.  AVAILABLE DEFENSIVE MEASURES 
 
Various defensive measures could be utilized to defend 
Patagonia from an unwanted takeover, even if it were not a benefit 
corporation.  One of the most powerful defensive measures is the 
combination of the poison pill and the classified board.107  Recently, 
in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. AirGas, Inc.,108 the Delaware 
Court of Chancery held this combination to be valid under the facts 
of that case.109  The decision did not appear to be an easy one, 
however, and the court said that the AirGas case should not be read 
to allow the board to “just say never” to takeovers.110  The court 
examined scholarship and case law on the issue before ultimately 
recognizing Delaware law’s “long-understood respect for reasonably 
exercised managerial discretion, so long as boards are found to be 
acting in good faith and in accordance with their fiduciary duties 
(after rigorous judicial fact-finding and enhanced scrutiny of their 
defensive actions).”111
In Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of A 
Social Enterprise Icon, Professors Antony Page and Robert Katz 
explain the various defensive measures Ben & Jerry’s could have used 
to protect itself from a hostile takeover, including a poison pill 
coupled with a staggered board.
 
112
Various takeover defenses, including and especially the poison 
pill coupled with the staggered board, may provide significant 
protection to a traditional corporation that is pursuing social and 
environmental ends.  However, there is increasing pressure from 
institutional investors to declassify boards and redeem poison pills.
   
113
 
 107. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The 
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 887 (2002). 
  
 108. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); see generally 
Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of Strategic Judicial 
Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502 (2012). 
 109. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 16 A.3d at 129. 
 110. Id.; see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, 
and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 511 
(1997). 
 111. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 16 A.3d at 129. 
 112. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the 
Sale of A Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 233–34 (2010). 
 113. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Thirty-Six Precatory Declassification Proposals Going 
to a Vote at Annual Meetings, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/ 2012/04/10/thirty-six-precatory-declassification-proposals-going-to-a-vote-at-annual-
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The benefit corporation solves that problem by signaling that it is 
interested in a different type of investor—an investor focused on 
multiple bottom lines.  The benefit corporation investor will be less 
likely to pressure for the removal of these takeover defenses because 
she has been attracted to the benefit corporation, at least in part, 
because of its mission.  How many of these socially motivated 
investors exist and how much they are willing to invest in these social 
enterprise forms, like benefit corporations, remains to be seen.114
 
 
D.  CONSTITUENCY STATUTES 
 
Approximately 30 states have some form of constituency 
statute.115  Constituency statutes, however, do not seem to have been 
very effective in combating the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm.116  Perhaps this lack of effectiveness stems from the fact that 
the typical constituency statute is permissive and does not give non-
shareholder stakeholders standing to sue.117  While constituency 
statutes undoubtedly provide some protection for directors seeking to 
further the social or environmental mission of the corporation, the 
constituency statutes do not seem to motivate the average director to 
move beyond the shareholder wealth maximization norm.  Of the 12 
states that have passed benefit corporation statutes, nine states 
already had some form of constituency statute.118  The benefit 
corporation statute does more than the typical constituency statute.  
First, the benefit corporation statute is mandatory, not permissive.119
 
meetings; John H. Matheson, Corporate Governance at the Millennium: The Decline of the 
Poison Pill Antitakeover Defense, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 703, 736 (1999) (noting that 
“shareholder proposals seeking to redeem or require a shareholder vote on rights plans [also 
known as “poison pills”] have been a favorite area for institutional investors.”). 
  
Second, the benefit corporation statute expressly provides the option 
 114. If these socially motivated investors do exist in significant numbers, the next question is 
whether they will remain socially motivated throughout the life of the company. 
 115. William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing 
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2009). 
 116. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Law Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes 
and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 108 (1999) (arguing that constituency statutes have 
not lived up to the hopes of their proponents). 
 117. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency 
Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1121 (2000) (arguing that “stakeholders need to be given 
standing to sue; otherwise, constituency statutes lack the power necessary to guarantee 
consideration of nonshareholder interests”). 
 118. See infra Appendix A. 
 119. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 301(a). 
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to give standing to non-shareholder stakeholders.120
 
  While few, if 
any, benefit corporations may take advantage of non-shareholder 
standing option, the shareholders in a benefit corporation should do a 
better job enforcing the mission than shareholders in a traditional 
corporation because the benefit corporation shareholders bought 
shares after being put on notice that the entity was a benefit 
corporation with a mission other than just maximizing shareholder 
value. 
VI.  BENEFIT CORPORATION SOLUTIONS 
 
The solutions discussed above may be sufficient in most cases to 
defend Patagonia, but the solutions have their mentioned flaws and 
limitations.  Benefit corporation statutes provide the improvements 
discussed below, and could be made even more beneficial by adopting 
the statutory amendments suggested in this Part. 
 
A.  FOLLOWING THE FLAG: SIGNALING SOCIAL FOCUS 
 
There is an instinct in the human race which delights in the flying of 
flags—a sentiment which appears to be inborn, causing men to 
become enthusiastic about a significant emblem raised in the air, 
whether as the insignia of descent, or as a symbol of race, or of 
nationality; something which, being held aloft before the sight of 
other men, declares, at a glance, the side to which the bearer 




In early warfare, warriors rallied around and were led by flags.122  
Flags guided, united, and signified a common cause.123
 
 120. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 305(a). 
  The benefit 
corporation label could serve as a metaphorical flag, a signaling 
device, for those interested in societal and environmental good.  As 
the benefit corporation form becomes more widely recognized, and if 
it becomes recognized as more than mere greenwashing, likeminded 
 121. BARLOW CUMBERLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE UNION JACK AND FLAGS OF THE 
EMPIRE 13 (3d ed. 1909). 
 122. WILLIAM FOSTER-HARRIS, THE LOOK OF THE OLD WEST: A FULLY ILLUSTRATED 
GUIDE 91 (2007). 
 123. CUMBERLAND, supra note 121, at 13; 2 GROUND WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 380 (Stanley Sandler ed., 2002). 
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directors and investors may flock to the form.124
The current benefit corporation statutes, however, do not 
provide a clear rallying point and currently appear unworkable in the 
mergers and acquisition context.  The current benefit corporation 
statutes require the corporation to pursue a general public benefit 
purpose.
  In an era of rampant 
greenwashing, having the form grounded in state statute is an 
advantage, even though the current statutes themselves are far from 
perfect.  Attracting directors and investors who believe in the 
corporation’s mission may serve as a powerful defense against hostile 
corporate raiders who desire to focus more strictly on short-term 
profits. 
125  In pursuing that purpose, most state benefit corporation 
statutes require directors to consider at least seven different 
stakeholder groups, but do not require prioritization among those 
groups.126  Under the current statutes, shareholders aligned with any 
one of those shareholder groups could bring a benefit enforcement 
proceeding to enjoin a merger.127
Amending benefit corporation statutes to require the 
identification of at least the company’s top priority (its primary 
specific public benefit) would lead to a better defined mission and cut 
against confusion among the corporate stakeholders.
  Under the current statutes, 
directors are provided no clear direction and no helpful guidelines for 
how to choose among offers to purchase the benefit corporation. 
128
 
  Requiring 
choice of at least a top priority would make it possible to create a 
sensible framework for directorial decisionmaking in the mergers and 
acquisitions context—providing guidance to directors, aligning 
investor expectations, and containing the appropriate amount of 
potential liability.  The next section explains how, with a few 
amendments to the statutes, benefit corporations can navigate in the 





 124. While discussion of game theory, signaling, and focal points is beyond the scope of this 
article, future articles may explore benefit corporations’ place in those areas.  See, e.g., HOWELL 
E. JACKSON, ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS, 33–34, 44–47 (2d. ed. 2011). 
 125. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 201(a). 
 126. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 301(a). 
 127. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 301(a), 305.  
 128. Murray, supra note 7. 
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B.  MISSION STICKINESS: REDUCING MISSION-DRIFT 
 
[Y]ou will come to the Sirens who enchant all who come near 
them . . . stop your men’s ears with wax that none of them may 
hear; but if you like you can listen yourself, for you get the men 




Mission-drift, or mission creep, is a frequently discussed topic in 
social enterprise circles.130  Organizations often drift from their 
intended purpose much the same way individuals drift from their 
personal goals.  The drafters of the benefit corporation statutes might 
be able to learn from the Yale economics, management, and law 
professors who created a website, stickK.com, where individuals can 
“sign contracts obliging them to achieve their personal goals” 
(Commitment Contracts).131  StickK.com is “based on two well-
known principles of behavioral economics: (1) People don’t always do 
what they claim they want to do, and (2) incentives get people to do 
things.”132  StickK.com allows individuals to precommit to actions 
they want to do, but that may be difficult to accomplish day-to-day.133  
Similarly, benefit corporation statutes attempt to allow managers and 
investors to pre-commit to a positive mission, which may be difficult 
to achieve once the Sirens’ call of short-term profit is heard.  Benefit 
corporation statutes attempt to reduce mission-drift and create some 
“mission stickiness.”134  This mission stickiness is currently created in 
two ways: the super majority vote and the benefit enforcement 
proceeding.135
 
 129. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, BOOK XII, 148 (Samuel Butler trans., 1944). 
  Mission stickiness could be improved, however, by 
amending current benefit corporation statutes and giving the statutes 
some teeth by requiring a floor for corporate charitable giving and a 
 130. See, e.g., Alicia Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional 
Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. 
BUS. L. 221, 257–59 (2012) (discussing the problem of mission-drift or “sell-out” in the flexible 
purpose corporation context); Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 805–807 (2011); (recognizing “philanthrocapitalism” as a cause of 
mission-drift); Christine Hurt, Family Christian Bookstores -- Private Equity, Mission Drift and 
the Religious Corporation, THE CONGLOMERATE, (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate 
.org/2012/11/family-christian-bookstores-private-equity-mission-drift-and-the-religious-
corporation.html. 
 131. STICKK, http://www.stickk.com/about.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. “Mission stickiness” is a term created for this article.  A statute that creates mission 
stickiness will reduce the amount and/or probability of mission drift by the entities subject to the 
statute. 
 135. See infra Part VI.B.1–2. 
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partial asset lock.  With these two amendments, governments could 
be more confident that the benefit corporations are actually doing at 
least some good, and then the governments could be more at ease if 
and when they provide incentives to benefit corporations.   
 
1.  Super Majority Vote and Dissenters’ Rights 
Most benefit corporation statutes require an affirmative vote of 
at least two-thirds of the shareholders to adopt or terminate benefit 
corporation status.136  This super majority vote creates a higher hurdle 
in those states that do not already require super majority voting for 
merger approval.137  The super majority vote hurdle is not impossible, 
however, and a determined acquirer could potentially convince two-
thirds of the shareholders to agree to the termination of the target’s 
benefit corporation status.  For the shareholders who vote against the 
adoption or termination of the benefit corporation statute, 
California’s statute explicitly provides dissenters’ rights to 
shareholders who will receive “fair value” for their shares.138  The 
traditional corporate statutes of many states, including Delaware, 
already provide for dissenters’ (or “appraisal”) rights under certain 
circumstances in the mergers and acquisitions context, so the 
provision of dissenters’ rights is certainly not unprecedented.139
 
 
2.  Benefit Enforcement Proceeding 
The benefit enforcement proceeding created by the benefit 
corporation statutes provides a way for a shareholder to potentially 
prevent a transaction that strays from the benefit corporation’s 
mission.140
 
 136. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 104–105; Murray, Benefit Corporations: State 
Statute Comparison Chart, supra note 56. 
  The benefit enforcement proceeding does not provide a 
right to monetary damages, but does provide grounds for a possible 
 137. Appendix B (showing that the traditional corporation statutes in half of the states 
where a benefit corporation statute has passed require approval by a majority of shareholders, 
while half of the states require approval by at least two-thirds of shareholders). 
 138. Oddly, Massachusetts’ benefit corporation statute gives appraisal rights to dissenting 
shareholders when a traditional corporation becomes a benefit corporation, but does not 
expressly provide appraisal rights when a benefit corporation becomes a traditional corporation. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 5, 8 (West 2012). 
 139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2012); see generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael 
L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119 (2005). 
 140. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 305; Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute 
Comparison Chart, supra note 56. 
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injunction.141  Problematically, the statute does not provide any 
guidance on the relative weighting among stakeholders, which means 
that any shareholder with affinity to any of the many listed 
stakeholder groups would potentially be able to enjoin a transaction.  
Also, the benefit corporation statutes allow, but do not automatically 
provide, standing for non-shareholder stakeholders.142  While most 
companies will probably not rush to give others standing to sue them, 
some benefit corporations may wish to give standing to one or more 
key stakeholder groups.  Such a grant may be evidence of the 
company’s long-term commitment to their mission.  This author is 
not, however, in favor of the statute providing automatic standing to 
non-shareholder stakeholders.  Given the variety among benefit 
corporations, it would be difficult to impossible to choose, via statute, 
the proper individuals or groups, other than shareholders, who should 
be given standing in every case.143
The defensive measures, discussed above, may be necessary to 
protect benefit corporations from hostile bidders who would destroy 
the company’s mission.  Also, benefit corporation statutes may 
properly allow companies like craigslist to avoid shareholder value-
centric outcomes like in the eBay v. Newmark case.  However, once 
the corporation has willingly entered Revlon-land and decided to sell 
the benefit corporation, the measure needs to be financially based.  If 
the measure were something else—say the environmental friendliness 
of the acquirer—the benefit corporation would end up giving itself 
away to maximize that non-financial, environmental return.  If, 
however, the measure were financial, the benefit corporation would 
be sold to the buyer who valued the benefit corporation the most, and 
the shareholders could use the proceeds as they see fit, including 
investing in different socially or environmentally focused companies. 
The distinction this paper makes between giving additional 
protections to the company’s social mission when Unocal applies, but 
requiring a financial focus upon entering Revlon-land, is based on a 
belief in the wisdom of director primacy tempered by director 
guidance and a small dose of director accountability.
   
144
 
 141. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 305; Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute 
Comparison Chart, supra note 56. 
  
 142. Id.  
 143. The benefit corporation employees are one group that might have a reasonable 
argument for being given standing, but it is more likely that employees would use that power to 
protect their own jobs and benefits rather than the mission of the benefit corporation. 
 144. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 141(a) (stating that “[t]he business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of the 
board of directors”); see generally Bainbridge III, supra note 80.  The current benefit 
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3.  Floor for Corporate Giving and Asset Lock 
Benefit corporations have been trumpeted as an antidote to 
greenwashing, but impact investors and governments may fear that 
the current statutes are toothless.145
Additionally, benefit corporation statute drafters could consider 
a partial asset lock for benefit corporations.  To prevent companies 
from raising capital for a benefit corporation by promoting 
themselves as a “good” company and then quickly selling to the 
highest bidder, the statutes could impose a lock on some percentage 
of the benefit corporation assets such that some percentage of the 
assets are guaranteed to be left behind even if the corporation is 
bought and has its benefit corporation status terminated.  The 
statutes could require that some portion of the assets be given to a 
charity with a similar mission to the benefit corporation.
  To combat the claim of 
toothlessness, and in exchange for the state-allowed privilege of 
calling their company a “benefit” corporation, the statutes could be 
amended to require a floor of corporate charitable giving by benefit 
corporations.  Perhaps the giving floor could match that which 
Patagonia has voluntarily adopted: the greater of one percent of 
revenue or 10 percent of profits. 
146
One of the major benefits of the benefit corporation legislation 
could be the grouping of “good” companies for quick and easy 
identification by investors, consumers, and governments for quick and 
easy identification.  Currently, there is little to nothing in the benefit 





corporation statutes provide no guidance and no real accountability.  The benefit corporation 
directors are required to consider all stakeholders.  By creating different formulae to compare 
the benefit of one stakeholder group to another, benefit directors could always made an 
argument that a sale, to almost any bidder, satisfied their duties.  Under Revlon, courts could 
impose a bit of accountability on directors who do not seek the best financial deal.  Other 
solutions are unworkable.  Providing directors with no real guidance, by telling them to pursue 
the vague “general public benefit,” would simply result in most directors pursuing their own 
self-interest.  Directing directors to maximize benefit to other stakeholders in a sale situation 
would ultimately result in no or minimal financial returns for shareholders.   
  The cities of Philadelphia and San Francisco have 
 145. Clark & Vranka, supra note 50, at 2–3 (stating that benefit corporations were created to 
help combat the problem of “greenwashing”). 
 146. The receiving organization should have both the same “top priority” as the benefit 
corporation that lost its status, and the receiving organization should be one that has a fair level 
of outside oversight, like a charity. 
 147. Benefit corporation proponents may point to the benefit enforcement proceedings, the 
third party standards, and the annual benefit reports as assurance.  However, upon closer 
examination, none of these lead to confidence.  The statutes do not give standing to bring 
benefit enforcement proceedings to non-shareholder constituencies and, in any event, monetary 
damages are not available.  Some of the statutes try to describe the third party standard with 
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already started giving preferential treatment to benefit 
corporations.148
 
  Those cities and their taxpayers should be provided 
more assurances that the benefit corporations are actually a benefit to 
society before giving preferential treatment.  If assurance is provided, 
through a statutorily required charitable giving floor and/or partial 
asset lock, then perhaps more governments would feel comfortable 
offering incentives for using the benefit corporation form.    
C.  DEFENDING PATAGONIA IN PRACTICE 
 
This Section explains how a modified benefit corporation statute 
could work in practice using Patagonia as an example.  Remember 
that for this exercise we are assuming that Patagonia is a publicly 
traded benefit corporation.  Before deciding to sell, Patagonia could 
use various takeover defenses to protect the company.  If the state of 
incorporation followed the Unocal line of reasoning when evaluating 
takeover defenses, the threat to the benefit corporation’s mission (in 
Patagonia’s case protecting the environment) could be considered, 
even to the extreme detriment of shareholder wealth.149
If, however, the directors decide to sell or break up the benefit 
corporation, then the directors should be required to sell to the 




words like “credible” and “comprehensive,” but none of the statutes provide assurance that the 
third party standards will be any good.  No real oversight of the third party standard makers is 
provided.  Finally, the statutory description of what the annual benefit reports must contain is 
thin, and most of the statues have no enforcement mechanism to deal with benefit corporations 
who do not produce the reports.  The author’s own research shows that a majority of the early 
benefit corporations that formed in Maryland, who should have produced benefit reports as of 
the writing of this article, have either not produced reports or have not produced reports that 
comply with the statute. 
  In contrast to Revlon, 
 148. City and County of San Francisco Municipal Code, AM. LEGAL PUBL’G CORP., 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:sanfrancisc
o_ca (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (San Francisco provides preferences in government contracting 
to California benefit corporations); City of Philadelphia: Tax Credits & Other Incentives, CITY 
OF PHILADELPHIA BUSINESS SERVICES,  business.phila.gov/pages/taxcreditsotherincentives. 
aspx?stage=start&type=all%20business%20types&section=financing%20%26%20incentives&bs
pcontentlistitem=tax%20credits,%20grants%20%26%20other%20incentives (last visited Jan. 30, 
2013) (the city of Philadelphia is providing a $4,000 tax credit, for the years 2012 to 2017,  to a 
maximum of 25 Certified B Corporations per year). 
 149. See supra Part III; under eBay v. Newark, defensive measures, erected by traditional 
Delaware corporations, that “openly eschew” shareholder wealth maximization are at risk of 
failing the first prong of Unocal.  16 A.3d 1, 34–35 (Del. Ch. 2010).  Benefit corporations, 
however, exist to pursue a “general public benefit” and any stated “specific public benefit” of 
the entity.   
 150. See supra Part IV.  But see Steven J. Haymore, Note, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B 
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the current benefit corporation statutes require the consideration of 
various stakeholder groups in each decision, including, presumably, 
when the sale or break up of the company is envisioned.151
 Trying to value the bids based on the benefit corporation’s 
mission is simply unworkable.  For example, as mentioned above, 
requiring the benefit corporation to maximize benefit to the 
environment, would result in the benefit corporation basically (or 
literally) giving the money away to an environmental organization 
that promised to do virtually every environmentally friendly thing 
possible.
  The 
consideration of these various stakeholder groups may be proper 
when trying to defend the benefit corporation.  However, once the 
company is on the auction block, the directors need to know how to 
value bids.  Revlon creates the best framework for valuing these bids, 
based on financial value. 
152  On the other hand, requiring consideration of multiple 
constituencies destroys the possibility of any real accountability for 
directors.153  When it has been decided that the company is going to 
be sold, maximizing the financial returns is the best directive.  The 
bidder who values the company the most will receive it, and if the 
former shareholders of the benefit corporation wish to invest the 
money they received in another benefit corporation or give the 
money away, they may.  The corporate giving floor and the partial 
asset lock, required in this article’s proposed amendments to the 
current benefit corporation statutes, would ensure that the benefit 
corporation’s mission was not completely abandoned.  The approval 
of the sale by a super majority of the shareholders, already included 
in the current benefit corporation statutes, would provide another 
hurdle for companies, like Patagonia, to clear if they wanted to leave 
their mission behind in a sale.154
 
  In short, a modified benefit 
corporation statute would create additional mission stickiness, but not 
a complete mission lock. 
 
Corporations and the Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311 (2011) 
(arguing that Revlon should not apply in the benefit corporation context). 
 151. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 301(a); Murray, Benefit Corporations: State Statute 
Comparison Chart, supra note 56. 
 152. See supra Part VI.B.2. 
 153. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“A manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity 
holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”); 
Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW 461, 470 (1992) 
(recognizing that “[i]f the board is never made accountable for its decisions, it is liable to 
exercise its power irresponsibly vis-a-vis the shareholders.”). 
 154. See supra Part VI.B.1. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this symposium article, Patagonia has served as an example of 
a company that wishes to stick to its mission in the face of potential 
takeover threats.  There are various defensive measures that 
Patagonia could employ to fend off hostile corporate raiders with 
inconsistent visions for the company, even if Patagonia were not a 
benefit corporation.  That said, the benefit corporation statutes come 
prepackaged with some useful provisions that increase mission 
stickiness, such as super majority voting, a predetermined corporate 
purpose, the benefit enforcement proceeding rights, and, in some 
states, dissenters’ rights.  This article has proposed amending the 
current benefit corporation statutes to require benefit corporations to 
select a primary non-shareholder stakeholder.  The selection of this 
primary stakeholder would shine light on the mission of the benefit 
corporation for investors, could provide needed guidance for 
directors, and would aid courts in determining whether the defensive 
measures erected were reasonable in relation to the threats posed.  
The article has also proposed the consideration of a statutorily 
required charitable giving floor and a partial asset lock to ensure that 
the benefit corporations are not merely engaged in greenwashing or 
faux corporate social responsibility.  Finally, the article has suggested 
that Revlon and its progeny could be relevant in the benefit 
corporation context, especially if a charitable giving floor and partial 
asset lock become statutorily required.   
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Appendix A 
 
State Unocal Revlon Constituency 
Statute 
California N/A N/A No 
Delaware Yes155 Yes 156 No  





































N/A N/A No 













 155. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 156. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 157. HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-221(a), (b) (West 2011). 
 158. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 2011). 
 159. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (West 2011). 
 160. Shenker v. Laureat Educ., Inc., 983 A.2d 408, 427 (Md. 2009). 
 161. Id. at 421–22 (2009). 
 162. Seidman v. Central Bancorp, Inc., 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 383, 2003 WL 21528509 at *9-10 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2003). 
 163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 2011). 
 164. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2011). 
 165. Int’l Banknote Co., Inc. v. Muller, 713 F.Supp. 612, 626–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 166. Minzer v. Keegan, No. CV-97-4077(CPS), 1997 WL 34842191, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
22, 1997). 
 167. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2011). 
 168. Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat. Financial Corp., 675 F.Supp. 238, 265-66 (M.D. Pa. Jun 
30, 1987). 
 169. 15 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a), (b) (West 2012); see also 15 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 515(a), (b) (West 2012). 
 170. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3) (West 2011). 
 171. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tysons, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 419, 421–22 (W.D. Va. 1994) 
 172. Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg.  Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 50 Va. Cir. 558, 
6 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1998). 
 173. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (West 2011). 
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 174. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (West 2012). 
 
 175. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14603 (West 2012). 
 176. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14604 (West 2012). 
 177. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 251 (West 2012). 
 178. HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-313 (West 2012). 
 179. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-3 (West 2011). 
 180. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-4 (West 2011). 
 181. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 805 § 5/11.20 (West 2012). 
 182. ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 § 40/2.05 (West 2012). 
 183. ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 § 40/2.10 (West 2012). 
 184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:112 (2012). 
 185. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1804 (2012). 
 186. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1805 (2012). 
 187. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-105 (West 2012). 
 188. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-03 (West 2011). 
 189. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-04 (West 2011). 
 190. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156, § 46B (West 2012). 
 191. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 5 (West 2012). 
 192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 6 (West 2012). 
 193. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-3 (West 2012) (in the case of a corporation organized prior to 
January 1, 1969 it must be by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the shareholders). 
 194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-3 (West 2011). 
 195. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-4 (West 2011). 
 196. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney 2012) (in the case of a corporation organized 
prior to existence of the current law it must be by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
shareholders). 
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 197. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1704 (McKinney 2012). 
 198. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1705 (McKinney 2012). 
 199. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1924 (West 2012). 
 200. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304 (West 2012). 
 201. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3305 (West 2012). 
 202. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-103 (2012). 
 203. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-210 (2012). 
 204. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-220 (2012). 
 205. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 11.03 (West 2012). 
 206. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.05-06 (West 2011). 
 207. VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11A, §§ 21.06-07 (West 2011). 
 208. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718 (West 2012). 
 209. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-785 (West 2012). 
 210. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-786 (West 2012). 
